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NOVA UNIVERSITY LISBON

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International Conference Epistemic Injustice and Public Arguments

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KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

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Welcome to the International Conference on Epistemic Injustice and Public Arguments (EIPA)!

Epistemic injustice has been explored over the past 15 years, in the two distinctive forms labeled by Miranda Fricker (2007) as testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, as well as in specific contexts such as in politics, health, education, law, etc. Scholars have described the specific harms caused by its systemic and structural manifestations in our contemporary societies and the potential strategies to resist the discrimination and oppression caused or reinforced by epistemic injustice. So much so that the epistemology of resistance (Medina 2012) is emerging as a fascinating new line of research.

With this conference, we are particularly interested in exploring the workings of epistemic injustice and the corresponding resistance strategies in public arguments from different contexts, considering power dynamics in relation to institutions, communication systems, groups and individuals. We aim to explore how public arguments may be strategically constructed to foster or consolidate different forms of epistemic injustice or, on the contrary, to curb and resist this phenomenon.

The contributions to the conference explore epistemic injustice and resistance in public arguments from various disciplines (including philosophy, argumentation, epistemology, communication, social sciences, etc.), taking into account various conceptual and discourse analysis methods (including argumentative analysis, linguistic analysis, cognitive analysis) and different contexts (such as politics, health, the law).

We wish all of you a productive and insightful conference!

ORGANISING COMMITTEE

Dima Mohammed
Maria Grazia Rossi
Federico Cella
Guido Tana

SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE

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Giulia Terzian
Robert Vinten

Abstracts

Keynote Speakers

Miranda Fricker

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, USA

Institutional Constructions of 'Avowal':

Public ideas of confession and rehabilitation

When we have public debates about criminal confession, or prisoner rehabilitation, do we even know what we are talking about? Do we know what the institutionalized forms of these phenomena actually are? Foucault famously traced the history of a form of testimony he labelled 'avowal' (aveu)—effectively a social institution of testimony under unequal power that however counts, necessarily, as true. Looking to the present, I will draw on the criminological research of Jason Warr and on Jennifer Lackey's recent work on Agential Testimonial Injustice, in order to put a spotlight on two institutions of testimony, each of which forms part of a system of procedures of criminal justice—one in the UK and the other in the US. I will analyse them as present-day institutional constructions of Foucauldian avowal.

José Medina

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, USA

Epistemic Injustice and Protest in the Public Sphere

Sometimes protests cannot get off the ground because they are preemptively silenced. Other times acts of protest are produced but they are not heard; and yet in other cases protests are noticed but they receive no uptake or only a superficial and defective uptake. This talk will critically examine the challenges that oppressed groups face when they try to protest under conditions of communicative marginalization. Elucidating the proper or improper uptake that publics give to protests, the talk will discuss the kind of communicative solidarity that we owe to social justice movements that advocate for the oppressed. An argument will be given for the special communicative obligations that we have toward oppressed protesting publics that have been silenced.

Abstracts

Alphabetical order

Alex Alexis

UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTREAL

PARIS 1 PANTHÉON-SORBONNE UNIVERSITY

From epistemic to ontological (in)justice: Investigating Indigenous claims before settler courts

This article explores the judicial handling of ontological and epistemic conflicts, focusing on how courts address claims rooted in diverse worlds and knowledge systems. Through comparative case studies of *Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia* (2017) and the Waitangi Tribunal in New Zealand (2023), it examines differing judicial responses to indigenous claims involving supernatural entities and data. The Canadian Supreme Court exhibits skepticism towards the Grizzly Bear Spirit, while the Waitangi Tribunal embraces Māori data as treasures. Analyzing these cases through Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice and Science and Technology Studies, the article discusses the implications of acknowledging multiple realities in judicial practice.

Álvaro Domínguez Armas and Marcin Lewiński

NOVA UNIVERSITY LISBON

Revisiting the communicative dimension of protests

Our goal in this paper is to examine Medina's (2023) insight into the communicative dimension of protests. Medina describes protests as acts that can be performed by multiple and different utterances (what he calls the 'polyphony of protests') that communicate more than one thing (what he calls the 'complex illocution of protests'). Although we agree with the first half of Medina's description of protests, we find the second half to be problematic. Medina describes protests as having three illocutionary forces: that of protesters (a) giving testimonies about political affairs, (b) evaluating a political matter as oppressive, and (c) prescribing demands. This description raises questions like: what is the relationship between (a), (b), and (c)? In this paper we argue that (a), (b), and (c) have a horizontal relationship: they are expressed at the same time with the same force and with one and the very same locution.

Martina Calderisi and Mara Floris

UNIVERSIT Y OF TURIN

UNIVERSITY VITA-SALUTE SAN RAFFAELE

A Bayesian Perspective on Diagnostic Delay: The Case of Endometriosis

Endometriosis affects 10-15% of women of reproductive age globally and is characterized by endometrial-like tissue outside the uterus, causing severe pain, infertility, and reduced quality of life. Early diagnosis is crucial for slowing disease progression, yet there is a significant diagnostic delay, averaging 5 to 11 years from symptom onset to diagnosis. This delay is partly due to skepticism toward patients' testimonies, with many women reporting that their pain is often dismissed as psychosomatic (Hudelist et al. 2012; Ghai et al. 2019). This dismissal represents testimonial injustice in healthcare.

This talk addresses diagnostic delays in endometriosis using a Bayesian framework, modeling diagnostic reasoning processes. Bayesian analysis highlights the role of testimonial injustice and reasoning errors like the base-rate fallacy in delays. Understanding these factors can inform future research and interventions to address diagnostic delays in endometriosis, improving patient outcomes.

Amandine Catala

UNIVERSIT  DU QU BEC   MONTREAL

Epistemic Injustice, Transformative Experience, and Epistemic Empowerment: Reclaiming the Public Discourse on Neurodiversity

Public discourses and representations about neurodivergence remain mostly shaped by the medical model and the pathology paradigm. Moreover, neurodivergence as an axis of social identity and marginalization remains largely unaddressed in debates on epistemic injustice and epistemic empowerment. In this paper, I argue for three main claims. (1) Inaccurate representations and negative discourses about autism create a new type of epistemic injustice, which I term existential hermeneutical injustice, which specifically affects a person's sense of identity or who they take themselves to be, by preventing a person from knowing and becoming who they are. (2) Accessing an autism diagnosis constitutes a hermeneutical breakthrough that is the source of a transformative experience for previously undiagnosed autistic women. (3) This transformative experience is in turn the source of epistemic empowerment that allows us to reclaim public discourses on neurodiversity toward greater epistemic justice.

Jordi Fairhurst Chilton

UNIVERSITY OF THE BALEARIC ISLANDS & KU LEUVEN

Minimizing Epistemic Injustice in Deep Disagreements

Recently, Lagenward has described and assessed how epistemic injustices can contribute to deepening disagreements. When prejudices and epistemic injustice come into play in a regular disagreement, this can lead to a normative higher-order disagreement about what counts as evidence concerning the original disagreement, which deepens the disagreement. The aim of this paper is to explore how forms of resistance can be implemented to combat those prejudices that give rise to injustice-based deep disagreements, thereby enabling constructive dialogue and epistemically valuable disputes. Specifically, I discuss how epistemic friction can minimize, eradicate, or avoid the normative force of said prejudices.

Monica Consolandi, Maria Floris, Noemi Paciscopi and Cristina Ganz

UNIVERSITY VITA-SALUTE SAN RAFFAELE

Towards a Taxonomy of Epistemic Injustice: Analysing Conversations Between Physicians and Patients in Healthcare Contexts

Fricker (2007) defines systematic testimonial injustice as the biased reduction of credibility based on identity prejudice. Carel and Kidd (2014; 2017) apply this concept to healthcare, showing that patients are often not seen as epistemically competent, contrary to Patient-Centred Care principles which prioritize patients' preferences, needs, and values. Drawing upon observational studies conducted at San Raffaele Hospital (Consolandi et al. 2020; 2024), we analysed conversations between physicians - oncologist, gastroenterologist, and surgeon - and patients diagnosed with pancreatic adenocarcinoma (PDAC). Our initial analysis aims to identify instances of epistemic injustice in conversations between doctors and patients. The long-term aim is to provide a taxonomy and develop systems to identify instances of epistemic injustice within conversations that are characterized by intrinsic asymmetries in levels of competence. We plan to collect additional recordings of conversations to verify the accuracy of this taxonomy.

Valentina Cuccio and Francesca Ervas

UNIVERSITY OF MESSINA – UNIVERSITY OF CAGLIARI

Epistemic injustice and metaphor resistance in the debate on schizophrenia

The paper examines epistemic injustice (EI, Fricker 2007) in metaphorical communication on schizophrenia. Schizophrenic patients show abnormalities of bodily self-experience (Gallese & Ferri 2014). We suggest that epistemic injustice in schizophrenia partly relies on a disruption of bodily mechanisms which affects schizophrenic communication at two levels. At a first level, a dysfunction of the bodily self-experience makes it not possible, for schizophrenic patients, the automatic attunement with the other which enables the establishment of a second-person epistemic perspective and the recognition of the other as an epistemic subject. At a second level, altered subjective experiences might lead patients to embody metaphors in a different way (Littlemore 2019). For this reason, their metaphors might not be understood. This problem, coupled with negative stereotypes held by interpreters, exacerbates EI. We propose a multilayered embodied account of metaphor and EI in schizophrenia and suggest possible routes to challenging EI via resistance to metaphor.

Claudia Galgau

KU LEUVEN

Epistemic injustice and the system of violence against migrants

In recent years there has been a global, exponential increase in institutionalized processes that "push back" migration in violent ways, by killing or violently displacing migrants at externalized borders. These processes, while illegal and dehumanizing, are increasingly publicly justified by transnational institutions and the media. In this paper, I show how epistemic injustice works to justify and legitimize systemic violence against migrants. More specifically, in focus on a type of epistemic injustice, where conceptual ambiguity, conceptual double standards and 'thin' concepts are operationalized to reinforce relative advantage/disadvantage of social groups. In conceptual engineering, ameliorative conceptual analysis refers to developing concepts to aid a specific emancipatory political aim (Haslanger 2000; León 2020). In this paper, I show that there is a flipside of this phenomenon operative in media and transnational institutions, where concepts are developed and strategically used to aid oppressive political aims. I work out how the emancipatory and oppressive ameliorative engineering differs, and how the latter amounts to epistemic injustice. I illustrate such an

oppressive ameliorative construction with the concept of 'exploitation', and how it amounts to justify violent migrant pushbacks.

Cristina Ganz and Noemi Paciscopi

UNIVERSITY VITA-SALUTE SAN RAFFAELE

Unveiling Testimonial Injustice in Obstetric Care: Insights from Midwives' Perspectives and Solutions for Dignified Practice

The aim of our presentation is to highlight forms of testimonial injustice during pregnancy and childbirth from the midwives' perspective. Through exploratory focus groups conducted in 2024 with midwives from both hospital and home birth settings in Northern Italy, we identified systematic testimonial injustices against women receiving obstetric care. These injustices can lead to obstetric violence, defined as the appropriation of women's bodies and reproductive processes by healthcare professionals. The study also reveals that midwives themselves suffer from epistemic injustice during interactions with other healthcare providers. The credibility deficit experienced by midwives often corresponds to a credibility excess attributed to other healthcare professionals. These injustices are rooted in the same negative gender biases that underpin the epistemic injustices faced by pregnant women. The midwives suggested solutions to address these injustices, including better communication and improved training for gynecologists and midwives, to ensure respectful obstetric care.

Nalliely Hernández and Melissa Amezcua

UNIVERSITY OF GUADALAJARA

Rorty's "Redescription" as Resistance to Hermeneutical Injustice: The Case of Femicide in Mexico

In this paper, we argue that overcoming hermeneutical injustices requires expanding the space of reasons and that the notion of redescription, which Richard Rorty opposes to argumentation, can be useful in such expansion as a form of epistemic resistance. First, we recover some criticisms made to the deliberative model of democracy and other epistemological perspectives that support the skepticism in argumentation and consensus as the main solutions to social conflict. Second, we argue that hermeneutical injustices require the creation of new arguments and concepts. We uphold that this hermeneutical exercise can be useful as a form of epistemic resistance and political action to expose and repair

such injustices. Third, we show that we need practices like redescription, which appeals to the social imagination generating perplexity and motivating new justifications. Finally, we illustrate such productive exercise in the case of femicide in Mexico and its evolution as a legal term, focusing on the emergence of the concept as an instance of feminist epistemic resistance and political activism.

A. Sophie Lauwers

KU LEUVEN

*Rethinking Norms for Public Argumentation:
Secularism, Public Reason and Epistemic Injustice*

This paper investigates widespread norms of so-called ‘public reason’. These norms, aimed at guiding legitimate argumentation in democratic deliberation, often rely on the expectation that ‘religion’ and ‘politics’ ought to be separated. However, I argue, such norms often further the marginalized position of religious minorities, by perpetuating existing epistemic injustices. To make this argument, I first outline dominant theories of public reason in liberal political philosophy. Second, I interrogate how these liberal norms for deliberation reinforce hermeneutic injustice, testimonial injustice, and epistemic ignorance towards religious minorities in particular. I argue that public reason norms reinforce both secular and Christian forms of hegemony: only depoliticized and interiorized religiosity is considered democratically acceptable, although many majority Christian values, practices and traditions can often pass as ‘secular’ and ‘cultural’, resulting in a double standard. Third, I explore why and how these findings call for alternative normative guidelines to achieve democratic deliberative justice.

Linh Mac

UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

Krinostic Injustice

This paper articulates a kind of epistemic injustice with respect to judgment. I dub it ‘krinostic injustice’ (in Ancient Greek, the verb κρῖνω means ‘to decide’). Relying on what I call a distinction between basic and interpretive reports, the paper illuminates a phenomenon in which a hearer believes a speaker’s testimonies insofar as they constitute basic reports, such as recollections of a series of events, but disbelieves the speaker’s testimony concerning the characterization of their

experience. To motivate the distinction between the two kinds of reports, I examine a lawyer's cross-examination of a complainant in a sexual assault case. I then develop the distinction and explain how a hearer's disbelief of a speaker's interpretative report constitutes krinostic injustice. Finally, I consider objections to my view in order to establish that KI really is a new and distinctive species of epistemic injustice.

Leonardo Barros da Silva Menezes

UNIVERSITY OF MINHO

Why are grateful refugees epistemically harmed?

My analysis, in this paper, challenges the idea that refugees are obligated to feel grateful towards their host society, as a closer look at the refugee protection system reveals that this obligation does not exist. To do so, I shed light on the epistemic wrongs recognised refugees are subject to when they are expected to display gratitude in their host country. This route leads us to go further than current debates on epistemic injustice against these groups as scholars have focused exclusively on the 'culture of disbelief'. I conclude by suggesting that the forms of epistemic injustice perpetrated against these people are not only about hearing the testimony of others or expanding our hermeneutical resources—though both are important—but also the structures through which we objectify them.

Ivan Mladenovic

UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE

Fighting Epistemic Injustice in Public Deliberation

The starting point of my presentation is the difference between ideal epistemic deliberation and real speech situations (Estlund 2008). Estlund argued that the model of ideal epistemic deliberation should not be a blueprint for real world institutions, since people will probably deviate from its norms. But this ideal has an important role to play in order to identify deviations in real speech situations and figure out the most appropriate countervailing deviations (Estlund 2020). However, this raises the following problem: fighting power with power by way of countervailing deviations instead of approaching ideal epistemic deliberation, might lead to political polarization (or to increasing political polarization). So, the main challenge that I will address in this presentation is this: how is it possible to

fight epistemic injustice in public deliberation by means of countervailing deviations without ending in political polarization?

Dima Mohammed

NOVA UNIVERSITY LISBON

Public Argument as Epistemic Resistance:

On Political Argumentation beyond Persuasion

Persuasion seems like a cornerstone of political argumentation. The pursuit of changing a public's mind has been at the heart of political argumentation in the classical rhetoric of Aristotle just as in the modern approaches (e.g. Zarefsky 2008). The pursuit of changing minds is considered important also from the perspective of critical dialectical approaches: Trying to convince the opponent of our position is central in many political processes, such as deliberation (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012) and the exercise of accountability (e.g. Mohammed 2018) among others. Yet, the persuasion account of argument isn't unchallenged. Even if one would not accept the radical idea that "Argument has no function" (Goodwin, 2007), it is undoubtedly desirable to make sense of the many instances where political arguments do not aim at persuading an audience of the acceptability of a claim (see for example, Doury, 2012). In this paper, I examine the role that persuasion plays in political argumentation. I discuss the specific goals and functions of public and political argumentation (Mohammed 2016, Zenker et al. 2023), with a focus on contexts characterised by epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007, Medina, 2012). Paying a special attention to the public argumentation of protest movements (Medina 2023). I argue that an adequate account of political argumentation today ought to go beyond persuasion and highlight the role of public reason-giving in epistemic resistance.

Elena Popa

JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY KRAKOW

Epistemic Trust Injustice in Public Health Context

This paper will investigate epistemic trust injustice in the context of public health. Epistemic trust injustice obtains in circumstances where 'due to the forces of oppression, the conditions required to ground one's trust in experts cannot be met for members of particular subordinated groups' (Grasswick 2017: 319). In public health, this is important because interventions such as vaccination

programs or following health advice require a trusting relationship between the public and the health authorities and/or scientists. Solutions such as supplying the public with additional knowledge or rhetoric focused around countering misinformation neglect the political underpinnings of particular groups having legitimate concerns whether public health truly works in their interests. I will argue that epistemic trust injustice can be ameliorated through acknowledging and highlighting structural issues regarding health disparities and providing medical and public health professionals with skills to spot them when working with patients and engage in advocacy.

Eduardo Ekman Schenberg

INSTITUTO PHANEROS, SÃO PAULO

Is evidence-based psychiatry founded on epistemic injustices?

Psychiatry has uncritically imported tools and discourses about rigor, objectivity and validity from Evidence Based Medicine (EBM). However, the epistemic authority of the Randomized Clinical Trial (RCT), which is placed at the top of the “evidence hierarchy” and frequently called “the gold standard” of research, has been repeatedly challenged (Cartwright, 2007, Deaton and Cartwright, 2018). This is particularly problematic in psychiatry, where subjectivity is the central topic of research and clinical practice. The results are testimonial and hermeneutic epistemic injustices (Fricker, 2007) as well as epistemic severing and epistemic trademarking (Massimi, 2022). Elucidating these can help explain why the efficacy of psychotherapeutic and pharmacological treatments is generally low (Leichsenring et al, 2022); and why psychiatric drugs have the highest rate of post-marketing safety events (80%) (Downing, 2017). Remedifying this requires an epistemic turn considerate of lived experiences, self-awareness, agency and multi causal pathways of mental distress and its treatment.

Eva Schmidt

UNIVERSITY OF MÜNSTER

Considering Epistemic Injustice in Deliberative Democracy Theory:

Public Deliberation and Hermeneutical Injustice

The critical tradition that Habermasian deliberative democracy theory was developed in centres around ideology critique and emancipation. Some scholars argue that the centrality of these core themes has been lost, as the debate has

shifted into an accommodationist paradigm. I argue that the critical core of deliberative democracy should be reactivated, as this is precisely what fosters inclusion and internal autonomy in citizens. The process of deliberation is supposed to enable ideology critique by giving every participant the 'right to justification', i.e., every deliberator can demand justification from each other, and no one can exempt themselves from questioning. Yet this process, I will argue, is undermined by hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice and wilful hermeneutical ignorance can block the understanding of concepts and explanatory approaches the way they are understood by those offering them. Especially for marginalized groups this can be an obstacle in prompting others to realize their ideological illusions.

Eugenia Stefanello

UNIVERSITY OF PADUA

When Ignorance is Bliss: Phenomenological Empathy and Loving Ignorance as Forms of Epistemic Resistance

Empathy is considered a fundamental tool for understanding the testimony of others (Stueber, 2006). I will attempt to challenge this claim. First, I will argue that the traditional way of framing empathy as an affective perspective-taking skill can exacerbate epistemically unjust dynamics by promoting epistemic arrogance (Liebow & Ades, 2022; Jones, 2022). Second, I will attempt to show that there is epistemic and moral value in not being understood (Bailey, 2018). Accordingly, I will suggest that we should reconceptualize empathy to account for a specific kind of positive lack of understanding and that a phenomenological definition of empathy inspired by Stein, combined with Tuana's concept of "loving ignorance," might be able to achieve this kind of positive lack of understanding (Stein, 1917; Tuana, 2006). I will conclude that this way of understanding empathy intertwined with loving ignorance can be considered a form of epistemic resistance (Medina, 2012).

George Surtees

UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD

The Intellectually Humble Approach to 'Trad Wife' Testimony

'Trad wives' and other members of marginalised groups sometimes use their oppressed identity to promote conservative ideologies. One might think this

undermines the idea that privileged people should exercise intellectual humility, deferring to the testimony of marginalised group members. If we think these ideologies are bad for oppressed social groups overall, the mere fact that they are supported by some members of those groups should not make us supportive of them ourselves. I believe we need two concepts to understand why this is so. Firstly, we can commit testimony injustice by giving members of marginalised groups too much credibility, as I think we can be in danger of doing in ‘trad wife’ cases. Secondly, we can be too intellectually humble, becoming intellectually servile. Taken together, these help explain where well-meaning hearers can go wrong in being persuaded by ‘trad wife’ testimony.

Nine-Marie van Veijeren

STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY

Relational open-mindedness: a virtue epistemological consideration of political deliberation and polarisation on social media

Discourse surrounding political deliberation regularly includes assumptions about epistemic norms, especially when it is focused on polarised deliberation on social media. The concern is that these epistemic norms assume that epistemic environments are equally hospitable for all epistemic agents, neglecting to consider epistemic injustice and systemic ignorance. For an epistemic norm to combat systemic ignorance and epistemic injustice, it will need to be reconciled with an understanding of epistemic actors and systems as relationally constituted. For the purpose of offering useful, effective deliberative norms, I examine the epistemic virtue of open-mindedness. I support the conception of open-mindedness that José Medina (2012) develops, but argue for a refinement thereof: open-mindedness as a motivation to engage relationally with the perspective of others. I argue that this open-mindedness can be instrumental to our evaluation of epistemic behaviour in polarised social media environments.

Eleonora Volta

UNIVERSITY VITA-SALUTE SAN RAFFAELE

From Silencing to Extracted Testimony in Trials for Gender-Based Violence: a Performative Approach

Much recent work in feminist philosophy of language and epistemology has focused on how power constrains speech and testimony. This paper aims to

highlight the flip side of silencing by looking at the productive power of sexist ideology in the context of the Italian crime trial for gender-based violence. Building on José Medina's performative account of epistemic injustice (2013, 2021), I argue that when sexist conceptual resources are used by the judge as an epistemic lens, they do ideological work by setting unfair constraints on the communicative and epistemic agency of the complainant in the obtaining of her testimony. Moreover, I argue that the very same hermeneutical insensitivities and distorting concepts that shape patterns of silence can give rise to forms of agential testimonial injustice (Lackey 2023) in which the only witness statements believed by the Court are those elicited through oppressive questions that obscure, deny, or minimize the reported violence, constituting a form of extracted speech (McKinney 2016). In practical terms, this paper intends to offer a possible theoretical tool to detect and counteract those unjust discursive practices that prevent an unbiased constitution of testimonial evidence.

Jingjing Wu

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK

Understanding Epistemic Injustice towards Indigenous People when Representing and Protecting Nature

This article investigates instances when the Indigenous peoples' voices for representing and protecting nature are dismissed in public debates and court cases due to different forms of epistemic injustice. The study applies the taxonomies provided by Fricker (2007), Medina (2012), and Dotson (2014) to three examples, each demonstrating how a particular type of epistemic injustice prevents the Indigenous community from representing and protecting nature. These examples include the Mbyá-Guarani tribe's relocation, Djab Wurrung People's fight to protect their sacred birthing trees, and the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador (2012). This article further suggests a distinction between individual, institutional, and societal virtues and discusses how these categories could contribute to correcting different types of epistemic injustice. In conclusion, the study emphasises the importance of applying the lens of epistemic injustice when engaging with Indigenous people in modern legal systems.

The International Conference on Epistemic Injustice and Public Arguments is organised by the Argumentation, Cognition and Language Lab (ArgLab) of the NOVA Institute of Philosophy (IFILNOVA) at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa.

The **ArgLab** is one of the leading, internationally acknowledged research structures in argumentation theory and mind and reasoning. Its basic aim is to offer a consistent philosophical perspective on the fundamental problems of human reasoning and argumentation in a way that directly enlightens crucial social problems. To this end, ArgLab investigates and develops forefront issues in argumentation theory, pragmatics, philosophy of mind and technology, meta-ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language. The focus on values allows for a situated approach, where philosophical concepts become tools for empirical investigation and social intervention in particularly salient social contexts - education, environment, healthcare, law, politics, and technology.

The NOVA Institute of Philosophy (**IFILNOVA**) is a leading Portuguese Philosophy research unit, whose mission is to develop research programmes around the thematic line of values. IFILNOVA's main goal is to contribute to the philosophical investigation of values, particularly by investigating the nature of value, the role of values in human action, as well as their normativity as constituted through public argumentation and reasoning in the ethical, political and aesthetic fields. To this endeavour, the thematic line of values is studied in different areas of Philosophy: Philosophy of mind, of language, epistemology, ethics and political philosophy, as well as aesthetics.

Universidade NOVA de Lisboa (**NOVA**) is one of the two top public universities located in Lisbon. NOVA currently hosts 40 Research and Development (R&D) Units, 24 of which represent partnerships with other national institutions, and 87% were considered units of excellence, placing NOVA in the top 3 of national universities with international recognition. At the UNL, IFILNOVA is hosted at the NOVA School of Social Science and Humanities (NOVA FCSH). It is one of 14 R&D Units, all funded by FCT, that develop over 100 projects annually funded by different national and international programmes, including Horizon Europe, ERASMUS+ and FCT.

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