Thomas Grundmann on “Epistemic Authority and Thinking for Oneself”

In my talk, I argue that two claims, both of which have a lot going for them, cannot easily be reconciled. On the one hand, experts possess the normative status of epistemic authorities for laypeople, i.e. the latter should simply defer to expert testimony and ignore their own evidence regarding the subject matter. I defend this Preemption View of epistemic authority by introducing a novel argument from higher-order defeat. On the other hand, thinking for themselves is epistemically highly valuable or even indispensable for laypeople. It would be an epistemic catastrophe, if laypeople stopped thinking for themselves altogether. In the talk, I explore the question of how the two claims can be reconciled. I suggest that, despite the initial tension, laypeople can simultaneously follow epistemic authorities and think for themselves, as long as the latter happens in terms of acceptances. I will explain the idea of thinking for oneself with acceptances in more detail and defend it against some standard objections.

Thomas Grundmann (University of Cologne)

To join the session on Teams, please get in touch with Maria Grazia Rossi at mgrazia.rossi@fcsh.unl.pt for the details.

This event is part of the ArgLab Research Colloquium organised by Maria Grazia Rossi and Giulia Terzian at the Laboratory of Argumentation, Cognition and Language of the NOVA Institute of Philosophy. For any inquiries, please contact Maria Grazia or Giulia.