Is conspiratorial reasoning analogous to scientific reasoning?

Certain views claim that beliefs in conspiracies resist falsification in the same way that scientific theories do — as Lakatosian degenerating research programs. Overall these views suggest that beliefs in conspiracy theories are unwarranted when they form the core of degenerating research programs. Their arguments hinge on drawing analogies between reasoning about scientific theories and reasoning about conspiracy theories. In this talk, I argue against these views. In doing so, I point out a crucial and fundamental reasoning style innate to conspiratorial beliefs which differs from scientific ones.

Everybody is welcome to join!

For online participation, please use the following link.

This event is organized by E. Rast. The purpose of this seminar series is to give researchers a platform to discuss ongoing work and problems in the philosophy of language, epistemology, argumentation, metaethics, and related areas. For administrative inquiries, please contact Erich Rast at erich@snafu.de.