João Fonseca
Research Fellow

João Fonseca is a collaborator and member of IFILNOVA since 1993 where he took part in several research projects. He published several peer reviewed papers and gave talks in many international conferences. Currently, in Philosophy of Neuroscience, his main lines of research are the development of a semantic/model framework for behavioral neuroscience from which some questions can be answered in a original vein (such as: what is the nature of generalizations in behavioral neurosciences, the links between psychology and neuroscience, the question of natural kinds in behavioral neuroscience or the status and role of multiple realization as an heuristic rule in scientific reasoning). In Cognitive Science he has been developing a suggestion to ‘kind-split’ the notion of ‘Core-Self’ into two more fundamental concepts: ‘Core-Self simpliciter’ and ‘Cognitive Core-Self’. This research links empirical research on topics like body-image and body-schema, neural predictive processing, the neural basis of body illusions such as ‘out-of-body’ and ‘full-body’ experiences. In Philosophy of Mind he is currently developing a formal proof of ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ and evaluating its drastic consequences to such topics as the explanatory gap, the hard problem of consciousness, mental causation and the project of finding the neural correlates of consciousness.

Publications
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Articles in conference proceedings
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2005
ArgLab • Articles in conference proceedings
Donald Davidson on Mental States, Realism and Neuroscientific Explanation
Donald Davidson on Mental States, Realism and Neuroscientific Explanation
João Fonseca
J. Sàágua (Org.), A Explicação Da Interpretação Humana (The Explanation Of Human Interpretation): Actas Da Conferência (pp. 271-280). Lisbon: Colibri.