The idea that agents are liable to suffer harms, and in some cases injustices, of a distinctively epistemic nature is increasingly widely accepted, at least in academic circles. The concept of epistemic injustice, in particular, continues to fuel descriptive-explanatory efforts to pinpoint the distinct forms under which the corresponding phenomenon may manifest.

Recognising that epistemic harms and injustices (can and do) take place cannot be the end of the story, though. For one thing, while at least some of the social dynamics underwriting various manifestations of epistemic wrongs have been explored in some depth, much remains to be understood about the distinctively communicative dynamics that bring about, sustain and amplify epistemic harms and injustices. For another, recognition of the existence and persistence of such harmful dynamics and outcomes makes evermore vivid the challenge of finding ways of rectifying them.

The two are, of course, related: the prescriptive challenge of righting epistemic wrongs cannot be adequately addressed without also filling a key gap in the explanatory project of understanding what was broken; and how it came to be so. Furthermore, proper inquiry into both these questions should be anchored to an overarching normative reflection: we need to have a clear vision of how things ought to be, in order to assess how badly they are broken, and how to put them right.

The present project will explore the multifaceted challenge of righting epistemic wrongs by recruiting the conceptual resources, knowledge bodies and outlooks of social and ethically-driven epistemology, social philosophy of language and contemporary political and moral philosophy. Its purposeful integration of a rich variety of conceptual resources and methodological frameworks will further enhance the robustness and credibility of its findings. Overall, it will contribute to deepening our understanding of the vulnerabilities, rights, obligations and limitations that define our epistemic agency.